Optimizely Supply-Chain Attack Hijacks Trusted Scripts Across 178 Major Websites
A vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation turned trusted CDN-hosted scripts into a malware distribution channel across 178 organizations.
In mid-November 2026, a supply-chain compromise in Optimizely's web experimentation platform turned trusted front-end scripts into a multi-stage malware delivery channel across at least 178 organizations, including global household names like BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC, IKEA, GitLab, and Equifax, without those organizations' own web servers ever being breached. Because the injected code was written into customer "Project JavaScript" fields and served legitimately over Optimizely's content delivery network (CDN) with valid TLS certificates, browsers treated the malicious payloads as routine experimentation code.
The incident—referred to in security reporting as "OPTIMJACK", highlighted a sobering reality for web teams running complex front-end stacks, including Drupal sites that rely on tag managers, analytics trackers, or experimentation snippets. When a third-party platform suffers an authorization or account-creation flaw, a single vendor can become a high-speed distribution pipe for crypto clippers, form skimmers, session stealers, and mobile exploit kits.
How the Attack Unfolded Across 178 Organizations
According to threat intelligence from Report URI, Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42, and industry reporting, the campaign followed an earlier wave between November 13 and November 16 that injected payloads via other third-party scripts (such as Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute Media). On November 16, 2026, attackers shifted onto Optimizely Web, abusing a vulnerability tied to account signup and project access to inject code into customer projects while leaving the rest of each snippet intact.
Report URI's timeline shows how rapidly the campaign escalated over a single day:
- 02:21 UTC (Nov 16): A clean capture of the BBC's Optimizely snippet is recorded prior to tampering.
- 04:21 UTC (Nov 16): The first Optimizely injection appears on the BBC's project, loading an injector script from
webshell.lol. - 04:28–08:28 UTC (Nov 16): Infrastructure for
1688360.ccis provisioned and registered, and the first version oftrack.js—initially focused on cryptocurrency address swapping—is observed loading onbbc.com. - 11:20–13:43 UTC (Nov 16): Modifications hit additional major properties such as Zoom, stolen crypto begins moving toward exchanges around 13:03 UTC, and payment card skimming capabilities are added to
track.jsaround 13:43 UTC. - 16:38–17:57 UTC (Nov 16): Additional iOS exploit-kit routing domains (
5vobauua3ojpklx.icuandeil786npto9u5bq.icu) are brought online, with Coruna iframe injection observed targeting iOS 18.6-or-earlier sessions. - 19:24–21:52 UTC (Nov 16): Report URI identifies 188 infected snippets across 178 organizations out of 1,611 snippets examined—noting the true count is likely higher, before Optimizely patches the flaw, revokes tokens and sessions, resets affected accounts, and cleans nearly all snippets by late evening.
Financial institutions represented the largest single sector among the 178 identified organizations (32 entities), followed by technology and retail brands, and even Optimizely's own www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com snippets were affected.
Inside the Payload: Four Ways the Script Targeted Visitors
Rather than deploying a single narrow script, the injected loader fetched track.js (directly or via base64/atob() decoding) and adapted its behaviour to the visitor's device, page context, and actions:
- Checksum-Validated Crypto Address Swapping: The script scanned for valid wallet addresses across Bitcoin, Ethereum and EVM-compatible chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin, verifying checksums before swapping them for attacker-controlled addresses. It altered addresses in page text, form fields, links, and images, intercepted clipboard copies and
navigator.clipboardwrites, modified outgoingfetch/XHRrequests,window.opencalls, navigation, and iOS share sheets, and re-scanned the DOM as content changed. Report URI traced roughly $7,040 in crypto to attacker wallets during the campaign. - First-Party Form Card Skimming: Introduced later on November 16, the skimmer watched form submissions and
fetch/XHRPOST requests for Luhn-valid card numbers alongside expiration dates and CVVs, sending captured sets vianavigator.sendBeacontohttps://1688360.cc/card.php. Card details entered inside isolated third-party payment iframes (such as Stripe or Adyen) remained outside the script's reach, whereas cards typed directly into a site's own form fields were exposed. - Cookie and Screenshot Exfiltration: When swapping addresses near payment or wallet terminology, the payload exfiltrated the page URL, non-
HttpOnlydocument.cookievalues, original addresses, and a DOM screenshot rendered withhtml2canvastohttps://1688360.cc/hit.php. - iOS Exploit Kits (Coruna and DarkSword): On iPhones and iPads, the script loaded
boot.jsfrom external router domains to inspect the iOS version and load exploit chains inside a hidden iframe—targeting iOS 13–17 with Coruna, iOS 18.x with DarkSword, and fingerprinting iOS 26 devices, with visitors on iOS 18.6 or earlier experiencing periodic 60-second page reloads as retry behaviour.
What This Means for Organizations and Drupal Teams
For Canadian organizations, the incident underscores how third-party web tooling can create compliance and security exposure even when core infrastructure is untouched. Any Canadian business, Crown corporation, healthcare body, or financial firm embedding external experimentation or marketing scripts on public portals—including Drupal sites—faces potential exposure of customer payment data, non-HttpOnly session cookies, or mobile endpoints.
Practical Hardening Steps for Drupal and Web Defenders
- Audit Snippets, Project Code, and Credentials: If your organization uses Optimizely Web, inspect every project's Project JavaScript and experiment code for unauthorized changes, rotate users, API tokens, and integrations with write access, and review logs for activity during November 13–17, 2026.
- Enforce Tight CSPs and Avoid
unsafe-eval: On Drupal sites, enforce strictscript-srcandconnect-srcContent Security Policy directives rather than relying on overly broad wildcards or'unsafe-eval', and start with a report-only CSP to map every external script and exfiltration endpoint observed in real browser traffic. - Isolate Payment Inputs and Cookies: Keep payment card entry inside hosted, origin-isolated payment iframes rather than custom first-party form fields, and mark sensitive session and authentication cookies as
HttpOnlyandSecureso injected scripts cannot read them viadocument.cookie. - Update Mobile Devices and Monitor Web Telemetry: Advise staff and users to update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later or iOS 26.3 or later, and monitor web analytics, error logs, and outbound network requests for unexpected third-party domains or unusual page-reload loops.
The vulnerability in this story
-
Not yet rated by the NVD: see the record on cve.org.
Scores and dates: NVD (not endorsed by the NVD). Each ID opens its record on cve.org.
